In this paper we discuss the observational equivalence between two monetary policy rules: a constant money growth rule and an interest rate rule. From the equilibrium conditions of a sticky prices model, we consider: (i) the Taylor rule parameter implied by the model with exogenous money supply; and (ii) the parameter of the money growth process implied by the model with an interest rate rule. We then compare the parameters of the two monetary rules in each case to evaluate the equivalence property. We show that the two monetary policy rules are not observationally equivalent (except in a very implausible empirical case) and therefore that the way of modeling monetary policy is of importance. 
Introduction
In this paper, we study under which conditions observational equivalence between interest rate rule and money growth rule may exist in a sticky prices economy. The question matters for any economist who wants to model monetary policy. Observational equivalence between the two monetary policies would lead the model builders not to care about it. Conversely, if observational equivalence does not hold, the way monetary policy is represented matters. We show that observational equivalence between the two monetary policy rules is a very special case and certainly not a general result.
A huge part of the literature is concerned by the monetary transmission mechanism (real and/or nominal frictions) and does not focus on the consequences of the way monetary policy is modeled. DSGE models either include a Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993 and They do so by arguing that the way monetary policy is modeled does not matter.
Does it matter? It is known that the way in which policy is described matters because the interest rate process that is generated by an exogenous money growth rule may or may not satisfy the Taylor Principle for equilibrium determinacy. The converse is also true. However, if one does not abstract from this technical issue but consider indeterminate cases when they appear, the previous question still holds. To go farther answering this issue, we discuss the observational equivalence between two representations of monetary policy. In a first case, monetary policy is represented as a stationary stochastic process of the growth rate of money supply. In the second, monetary policy is of a Taylor-type rule, i.e. a relationship between interest rate and expected inflation. 1 We start from a general equilibrium monetary model, a sticky prices model, that is sufficiently simple to get analytical and explicit results. 2 We use this model as a Data Generating 1 This paper is related to Vegh (2001) who identifies basic equivalences between monetary rules in a continuous time environment. It further relates to Schabert (2005) who analyzes the relation between interest rate targets and money supply in a cash-in-advance model. Notice that we also do so by assuming that the Taylor-type rule incorporates the current inflation rate.
2 This model is chosen because this approach is based on the idea that temporary nominal price rigidities Process (DGP) that allows to reproduce some features of actual data, which are taken as the realization of an unknown stochastic process. Following a common econometric practice (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999) , we first use GMM to estimate the relation between the nominal interest rate and the expected inflation under the model with exogenous money growth rule. Second, using OLS, we estimate the money growth relationship under the model with an interest rate rule.
We first discuss the results when the true monetary policy is the exogenous money growth.
When the parameters that describe private behavior in this economy are calibrated with respect to their empirical counterparts, the implied estimate of the Taylor rule parameter is strictly greater than one, provided the growth rate of money supply displays positive serial correlation. It follows that the estimated value of this parameter is close to the ones of estimated Taylor rule (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000) . 3 The estimated parameter of the Taylor-type rule turns out to be a non-linear decreasing function of the money growth parameter that accounts for the persistence of money injections. When money injection are very persistent, the nominal interest rate weakly reacts to expected inflation and the real interest rate remains almost constant. Conversely, when money injection is almost white noise, the estimated central bank reaction function implies that the nominal interest rate strongly responds to expected inflation. It follows that "active" Taylor rule are associated with weak persistence of money injection.
We then consider the stochastic process of money growth implied by the sticky prices model with a Taylor rule. As shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , including Taylor rule in this model leads to indeterminacy.
We restrict our analysis to the indeterminate case for two reasons. We show that when monetary policy is represented by an exogenous money growth rule, the Taylor rule parameter depends on two parameters that describe private behavior and on the money growth rule parameter. For any empirical plausible value of these parameters, the Taylor rule parameter will be greater than one. This leads to conclude that observational equivalence may appear only if the Taylor rule parameter is greater than one. In this case, the model generates indeterminacy (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001 ). We therefore have to focus on the indeterminacy provide the key friction that gives rise to nonneutral effects of monetary policy (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999 for a discussion). In addition, the observational equivalence results are consistent in both sticky and flexible prices frameworks. 3 Assuming that the central bank follows an endogenous money growth rule leads to the same conclusions.
case to study the observational equivalence properties between the different monetary policy rules. Second, and more important, when studying observational equivalence the interpretation of the parameters of the two monetary policy rules matters. In the determinate case with the Taylor rule, one may be willing to study observational equivalence by assuming that monetary policies (money growth rule and interest rate rule) are represented by an AR (1) process. However, the parameters do not deserve the same interpretation in that case: the Taylor rule parameter corresponds to the smoothness parameter of the money shock while the money growth rule parameter is the persistence parameter of the shock. In the indeterminate case, the same interpretation may be given to both parameters. For this additional and important normative reason, we exclude the determinate case from our study.
We determine the dynamic properties of the sticky price model when monetary policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule. Four sunspots affect the growth rate of money. However, only one of them may lead to conclude that monetary policies are observationally equivalent.
We then focus on this sunspot that is due to real indeterminacy. In such a case, we show that when the effect of labor supply behavior and technology do not account for the dynamics of the model, we retrieve the observational equivalence between the two monetary policies. 
The monetary economy
This section is devoted to an exposition of the model. We set up a sticky prices model with monopolistic competition, consistent with the monetary transmission mechanism (see e.g., Hairault and Portier, 1993 , King and Wolman, 1996 , Galí , 1999 , and Ireland, 2001 ).
The model is deliberately stylized to highlight structural relations between nominal variables (inflation, interest rate and money growth) and to determine analytically the solution of the model.
Households
The economy comprises a unit mass continuum of identical, infinitely-lived households. Each household has preferences over consumption and leisure represented by the following intertemporal utility function :
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, χ ≥ 0 and h t denotes the number of hours supplied by the household. E t denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set available in period t.
A representative household enters period t with nominal bonds B t and nominal balances
M t brought from the previous period. During the period, the household supplies labor h t at the real wage W t /P t . In addition, it receives a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authorities in the form of cash equal to T t , profit from the firm Π t , and real interest rate payments from bond holdings ((R t−1 −1)B t /P t ). These revenues are used to buy consumption goods (C t ), money balances (M t+1 ) and nominal bonds (B t+1 ) in the next period. Therefore, the budget constraint can be written as
The household faces a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint of the form:
Money is held for transaction motives. The household carries cash to purchase consumption goods. We restrict our attention to equilibria with strictly positive nominal interest rate so that the cash constraint is always binding. We let C t denotes a composite consumption index defined by :
, where C i,t is the quantity of good i ∈ [0, 1] consumed in period t and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods. The price of good i is given by P i,t and the general price index P t is given by:
.
The household determines its optimal consumption/saving, labor supply and money and bond holding plans, maximizing utility subject to the budget and cash-in-advance constraint.
The quantity of good i consumed in period t is given by:
Consumption behavior together with labor supply yields
whereas nominal return of bond holdings is given by:
This last equation, together with the CIA constraint, determines money demand where, for a given real wage, real balances are a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
Firms
In this economy, there is a continuum of firms distributed uniformly on the unit interval.
Each firm is indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and produces a differentiated good with a technology which implies diminishing returns to hours worked
with α ∈ (0, 1] and where A is a strictly positive scale parameter. At the end of period t − 1,
i.e. before observing the realization of the money supply shock in period t, firm i sets the price P i,t at which it will be selling good i during period t, for a given aggregate price P t .
The firm is owned by the household, and pays its profits out to the household at the end of each period. Because of the CIA constraint on household consumption, the firm discounts its profit using Φ t+1 = β/(P t+1 C t+1 ). Therefore, for a given wage W t , the firm i will seek to
The firm's optimal pre-set price is thus given by:
The Government
The government issues nominal bonds B t to finance open market operations. The government budget constraint is
with M 0 and B 0 given.
The Monetary Policy
We consider two alternative monetary policies. In the first case, as is standard in monetary economics, monetary policy is described by an exogenous money growth rule. In the second case, monetary policy is represented by a Taylor-type rule describing how a central bank sets the nominal interest rate in response to economic variables. In what follows, we provide the details of the monetary rules we consider. 4
Exogenous Money Growth Rule
Money is exogenously supplied according to the following rule
in which the gross rate of money growth γ t follows an AR(1) process:
ε γ t is white noise with unit variance σ ε γ > 0 and |ρ γ | < 1. In this case, the Central Bank could implement what is essentially the classic textbook policy of dropping freshly printed money from a helicopter. A money-financed cut is then essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop of money".
Interest Rate Rule
We specify the following Taylor-type rule
where a hat denotes the percentage of deviation from the long run value. This Taylor 
Equilibrium Conditions
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices and allocations, such that each price, allocations maximize both profits and utility, and all markets clear. In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms will set the same price P t and choose identical outputs and hours. Goods market
and all t. The equilibrium conditions can be approximated by log-linearization about the deterministic steady state:
where γ t = M t+1 /M t denote the gross rate of money growth.
Equilibrium conditions with a Money Growth Rule
Using the money growth rule (1) and the previous equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following model solution:
Equilibrium conditions with a Taylor Rule
As shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , the inclusion of a Taylor rule in this model leads to indeterminacy. Under the interest rate policy (2), money supply is endogenous. From (4) and (2), it follows that
Now, using (5) and taking expectations at period t − 1, we obtain the first-order linear difference equation for output
The dynamic properties of the equilibrium critically depend on the value of η with respect to the unit circle. We define η , with η ≡ (1 + χ)/(2(1 + χ) − α), as a threshold value for indeterminacy. When η < η , the equilibrium is locally determinate. Conversely, the equilibrium is locally indeterminate when η > η . The threshold value η is positive and can exceed one provided that χ (resp. α) is sufficiently small (resp. large). We concentrate on positive values of η, because previous empirical studies suggest that this parameter is strictly greater than one (see Taylor, Let
whereupon equation (9) becomes: Moreover, nominal indeterminacy occurs for any value of η and ϕ:
where E t−1 ε g t = 0. By nominal indeterminacy, we mean that the inflation rate is free, i.e. there is nothing to pin down the initial growth rate of money. Consequently, the growth rate of money is determined by four sunspots.
Therefore, aggregate fluctuations in deviation from the deterministic steady-state, depend on the parameters of the monetary policy η, the parameters that describe the private behavior (χ and α) and on those summarizing the sunspot variables, i.e. their relative variances. 5 As explained by Carlstrom et Fuerst (2001) , the mechanism that leads to indeterminacy is as follows.
Consider a sunspot-driven increase in current consumption. When η > η , the intertemporal allocation of saving lowers the real interest rate and thus the nominal interest rate. The intratemporal allocation raises real balances and thus consumption increases due to the CIA constraint. This increases in consumption completes the circle because it insures that initial beliefs are rational.
Given the solution of the two models, we consider below: (i) the Taylor rule parameter (η ρ ) implied by the sticky prices model with exogenous money supply, and (ii) the parameter of the money growth process (ρ η ) implied by the model with a Taylor rule. We then compare the two parameters in order to evaluate some equivalence properties.
The Estimated Interest Rate Rule
Any monetary rule must be estimated using aggregate data which are the realizations of economic equilibrium, i.e. a reduced form that defines a set of endogenous variables in terms of exogenous and predetermined variables. Therefore, the econometrician must use a set of relevant instrumental variables in order to identify and estimate the structural equation that characterizes central bank behavior. Empirical studies on the Taylor rule generally use lagged inflation and the lagged nominal interest rate as instrumental variables (see Gertler, 1998, 2000) . Using the same procedure, we estimate the relation between the nominal interest rate and expected inflation under the sticky prices model with an exogenous money growth rule.
We assume that the monetary model (6)- (8) with exogenous money growth rule constitutes the "true" Data Generating Process (DGP). This DGP permits actual data to be generated. Such data are taken as the realization of a stochastic process, that is, unknown to the econometrician. The features in which we are interested include conditional moments of the nominal interest rate and inflation. Rule (2) can be expressed in terms of observable :
where
The econometrician observes values of the nominal interest rate R t and the inflation rate π t+1 and uses these data as actual data without any explicit knowledge about the DGP. To estimate central bank behavior, the econometrician uses a set of instrumental variables that aim at describing informative shifts in money demand behavior. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the econometrician uses a single instrument. As we are interested in co-movements of the nominal interest rate and inflation, the necessary condition for identification of the central bank policy function is fulfilled. Let z t denote a single instrument known in period t. To be a valid instrument z t must satisfy the following orthogonality condition
or equivalently
Equation (13) is the basis for GMM estimation of the parameter η. Since the number of orthogonality conditions is equal to the number of parameters of interest, it follows that the GMM estimator (or IV estimator in this simple case) is free from any weighting matrix and can be obtained directly as the sample counterpart of (13). 6 Following previous empirical work (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000) , an appropriate instrumental variable is the once lagged inflation rate. 7 The orthogonality condition (13) becomes:
From (14), the plim of the GMM estimator η ρ is thus given by:
The GMM estimator η ρ is obtained from the autocovariance functions of the processes of inflation and nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1. The plim of the GMM estimator η ρ under the sticky price model with exogenous money growth rule is given by:
The econometrician could also use the current inflation rate as an instrumental variable, because, in the sticky price model, inflation responds with one lag to monetary innovations.
Current inflation is thus uncorrelated with the error term ε γ t . We study the evolution of the GMM estimator η ρ of η with respect to the three parameters χ, α and ρ γ . When α = 1 and χ = 0, the GMM estimator η ρ of η is equal to 1/ρ γ .
It follows that the GMM estimator is strictly positive, provided the growth rate of money supply displays positive serial correlation. Further, when we consider values for ρ γ that correspond to the range of existing OLS estimates with M 1 and M 2 (in the interval (1/2, 2/3)), 6 The estimator is called a GMM estimator by an abuse of terminology. In fact, it is a IV estimator that corresponds to a GMM estimator at the limit. 7 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) include lagged inflation rates up to four lags. To keep tractable results, we do not introduce over-identifying conditions and consider only one lag inflation rate as the instrumental variable. However, our results are left unaffected when over-identifying conditions are considered.
the estimated value of η is close to those of previously estimated Taylor rules (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) , tables II and III, p 157 and 160). 8 In addition, it is easy to see that η ρ is decreasing in χ. When labor supply is inelastic, the GMM estimator η ρ of η leads to one. In such a case, the model exactly reproduces a Fisher equation. Indeed, when labor supply is inelastic, households cannot avoid the inflation tax created by monetary policy. Finally, η ρ is increasing in α and decreasing in ρ γ . To study the evolution of the GMM estimator η ρ of η with respect to ρ γ , we calibrate χ and α with respect to their empirical counterparts. We set χ = 1 (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005 and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde, 2005) and α = 0.6 (see Cooley and Prescott, 1995) . We then let ρ γ free to vary within the interval [0.2; 0.8] -which corresponds to a large enough interval to take into account all the plausible empirical values of this parameter -and plot the evolution of the GMM estimator η ρ . Figure 1 clearly highlights that for plausible values of the three parameters χ, α and ρ γ , the estimated value of η is greater 8 Notice that we checked the robustness of this result to the introduction of capital accumulation in the model. The results are unaffected also when we consider different types of shocks or when the lagged interest rate is introduced in the interest rate rule.
than one and is not far from those of previously estimated Taylor rules (see Taylor, We may also consider an endogenous money growth rule. In such a situation, the central bank adjusts the supply of money in response to changes in inflation. Let us assume the following simple rule:
The properties of this rule, in terms of local price determination, have been examined by Black [1974] and more recently by Schabert [2006] by considering different fiscal policy regimes. We consider this rule for one main reason. In this case, the money growth rate depends on the inflation rate. In such a case, the central bank aims at stabilizing the inflation rate by adjusting the quantity of money in circulation in the economy. The Taylor rule considered in the paper is also a stabilizing rule. The two rules are therefore comparable in a deep sense. To ease the comparison, we plot on a same figure, the implied value η ρ when the money growth rule is assumed to be exogenous and endogenous. In the case where the money growth rule is endogenous, Figure 2 highlights that for plausible values of χ and α and for a large enough interval of values of ξ, the estimated value of η is very close to one, and more importantly greater than one since ξ is greater than −0.6. As a matter of fact, these estimated values are also close from those of previously estimated Taylor rules. For the same parameters, the estimated value of η ρ is greater than one when the money growth rule is exogenous. Therefore, our conclusion holds independent of whether the money growth rule is endogenous or exogenous. Finally, we check the robustness of these results against different forms of the Taylor rule.
As a matter of fact, the results are similar with other forms of the Taylor-type rule. For instance, we assume that the Taylor rule incorporates only the current inflation rate. We expose this case in the paper, because it is directly related to the previous robustness check.
Indeed, one may also want to compare the observational equivalence result obtained under the model with endogenous money growth rule that incorporates the current inflation rate and a Taylor-type rule that also considers the current inflation rate. In this case, the implied static Taylor rule under the sticky price model with exogenous money supply rule has then the form:
The results are similar to those exposed in Proposition 1 with one additional term, ζ t , that 
This proposition leads to important conclusions for quantitative researchers and policymakers. First, in the special case where α = 1 and χ = 0, the plim of the OLS estimator reduces to: ρ η = 1/η, and thus we obtain the observational equivalence between the two rules. Second, this special case is not empirically relevant; and, except for this particular case, there does not exist any observational equivalence between the two monetary policy rules. Figure 3 highlights this result. To compute the figure we proceed as follows. The figure clearly shows that observational equivalence between the two representations of the monetary policy is only a special case that depends on the parameters that describe private behavior in this economy. Therefore, the modeling choice for monetary policy is important because it yields very different dynamic properties.
What is driving this result may be explained as follows. In the model with exogenous money growth rule, inflation expectations are governed by the persistence of the inflation tax, i.e. the persistence parameter ρ γ of money supply. When ρ γ leads to 1, expected inflation is equal to the nominal interest rate and thus η ρ leads to 1. In the model with a Taylor rule, the dynamic behavior of endogenous money supply inherits the behavior of output. The autoregressive parameter in the output equation includes the Taylor rule parameter η, as well as the other parameters α and χ that describe private behavior. When the effect of these two parameters is canceled (i.e. when α = 1 and χ = 0), the autoregressive parameter will depend only on the Taylor rule parameter, and we retrieve the observational equivalence under this restricted version of the model. On the contrary, when the effect of labor supply behavior and technology account for the dynamics of the model, the observational equivalence vanishes.
Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the observational equivalence between two representations of monetary policy. Firstly, monetary policy is represented by an exogenous money growth rule. Secondly, monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule. This is done using a sticky prices economy. We consider (i) the Taylor rule parameter implied by the sticky prices model with exogenous money supply; and (ii) the parameter of the money growth process implied by the model with a Taylor rule. We compare the two parameters in order to evaluate some equivalence properties. We show that the two monetary policy rules are not observationally equivalent (except in a very implausible empirical case). Therefore, the modeling choice of monetary policy is important.
